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Article 2

Beyond Blood and Borders:
FINDING MEANING IN BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
D. Carolina Núñez†
INTRODUCTION
Several decades ago, Alexander Bickel asserted that
citizenship in the United States was (and ought to be) nothing
more than a theoretical distinction with little practical value.
“[W]e live under a Constitution to which the concept of
citizenship matters very little indeed,”1 he wrote. Under Bickel’s
view of the Constitution, the government protected the rights of
persons, rather than the rights of citizens: “It remains true that
the original Constitution presented the edifying picture of a
government that bestowed rights on people and persons, and
held itself out as bound by certain standards of conduct in its
relations with people and persons, not with some legal construct
called citizen.”2 For Bickel and others, the Constitution, which in
its pre-amendment form maintained silence on the definition of
citizenship and scarcely even mentioned the term, limited very
few rights to citizens.3
†

Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. I am grateful for the insights and comments offered on prior drafts by
RonNell Andersen Jones, Kif Augustine-Adams, Shima Baradaran, Teneille Brown,
Wendy Gerwick Couture, Brigham Daniels, Lisa Grow Sun, Sarah Haan, Christopher
Lasch, Michelle McKinley, Kim Pearson, Addie Rolnick, Jeff Schwartz, and Jane
Yakowitz Bambauer. Many thanks to my research assistants, Garrett Beeston, Josh
Bishop, Melanie Grant, and Megan Flager for their excellent work.
1
Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L.
REV. 369, 387 (1973).
2
Id. at 370. In contrast to Bickel’s approval of citizenship’s relative lack of
importance in his perception of the Constitution, several scholars lament what they see
as the devaluation of citizenship in the United States. See, e.g., PETER J. SPIRO,
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 6-7 (2008); Peter H.
Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989).
3
Bickel, supra note 1, at 369. As noted by Bickel, prior to the Reconstruction
amendments, the Constitution’s treatment of citizenship was essentially limited to a
bestowal of the naturalization power to Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the
requirement that the offices of President, id. art. II, § 1, Congressman, id. art. I, § 2,
and Senator, id. art. I, § 3, be filled by citizens, and the citizen’s guarantee against a
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Bickel’s conclusions about the importance of citizenship
have not carried over into the popular or political estimation of
citizenship. It turns out that citizenship—as well as the type and
strength of an individual’s claim to citizenship—matters a great
deal, at least in public rhetoric.4 Being a citizen in the United
States connotes belonging to and engaging in its society.5
Citizens are wanted insiders, while noncitizens are tolerated
outsiders at best and uninvited pariahs at worst. In many
settings, public rhetoric contemplates only “citizens” and “illegal
aliens.”6 In this binary conception of membership, the “citizen” is
a desirable, integral part of our national polity, while an “illegal
alien” is an uninvited intruder. The “citizen” contributes and
participates, while the “illegal alien” consumes and depletes.7

state’s abridgement of privileges or immunities, id. art. IV, § 2. Bickel, supra note 1, at
369. As a result of the Constitution’s guarantees of rights to “persons” and “people,”
aliens, regardless of immigration status, have enjoyed a variety of constitutional rights
while in the United States. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229-30 (1982) (holding
that undocumented children are entitled to the same public education that their
documented and citizen counterparts are entitled to); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending the reasoning of Yick Wo to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that aliens
within the United States are entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment).
4
Quite illustrative of the increasing interest in an individual’s claim to
citizenship is the public scrutiny of Barack Obama’s birth certificate in relation to the
requirement that the President be a natural born citizen of the United States. See Dan
Pfeiffer, President Obama’s Long Form Birth Certificate, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 27,
2011, 8:57 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/27/president-obamas-longform-birth-certificate. This is not to suggest that the public inappropriately demanded
U.S. citizenship of the president; the Constitution clearly requires as much. U.S.
CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 4. Rather, the unusual and intense focus on the details of the
president’s birth certificate combined with opponents’ expressed suspicions of the
president’s loyalty and legitimacy illustrate the strong connection between citizenship
and membership. Nothing less than citizenship could quell the perception of “otherness”
that injected itself into public debate about the president. See Editorial, A Certificate of
Embarrassment: The president is Finally Forced to React to a Preposterous Political Claim
About His Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
04/28/opinion/28thu1.html (characterizing the challenges to the president’s citizenship as
“a proxy for those who never accepted the president’s legitimacy, for a toxic mix of
reasons involving ideology, deep political anger and, most insidious of all, race”).
5
Justice Warren characterized citizenship as “nothing less than the right to
have rights.” See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 63 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).
6
See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word “Citizen” in
Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. L.J. 1557, 1557 (2008) (exploring the use of
the word “citizen” in judicial opinions and commentary on the Fourth Amendment as
coterminous with person or people and arguing that such usage exacerbates bias
against immigrants).
7
This binary conception of membership even carries over into court opinion
discussions of fundamental constitutional rights, with opinions often characterizing
rights that are not explicitly linked to the concept of citizenship as rights of “citizens.”
See, e.g., id. at 1576-77.
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As the rhetorical gap between citizenship and alienage
widens, the rules by which the United States awards birthright
citizenship have come under scrutiny, especially as they relate
to unauthorized immigration.8 The Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States,”9 has historically served as a broadly inclusive guarantee
of citizenship for virtually all children born within U.S.
territory.10 This bestowal of citizenship based on birth within
U.S. territory is a form of jus soli—that is, the right of the soil or
land. Scholars and politicians, however, have increasingly
advocated withholding jus soli citizenship from the children of
undocumented immigrants.11 The current, inclusive understanding
8

Marc Lacey, On Immigration, Birthright Fight in U.S. Is Looming, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/politics/05babies.html;
Ed Hornick, Is the Next Immigration Fight Over “Anchor Babies”?, CNN ONLINE (Apr. 28,
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/04/28/anchor.baby/index.html.
9
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10
Some widely accepted exceptions to this broad inclusivity have been the
children of foreign diplomats, prisoners of war, and prior to 1924, American Indians
living under the tribal rule, see Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), all of whom have
been interpreted as being insufficiently “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 171 (1996). In one sense, these classes of persons
may be said to be outside the territory of the United States by a legal fiction derived
from the immunities these classes derive from treaty or international law. See id.
11
These proposals and academic arguments take two forms. Some have
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States,” does not obligate the United States to confer citizenship on the
children of undocumented immigrants because they are not “subject to the jurisdiction”
of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, proponents of this view have
proposed bills to statutorily define “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as including only
the children of legal permanent residents and citizens. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK &
ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN
POLITY 116 (1985). Many bills operate on the assumption that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require birthright citizenship to the U.S.-born children of most
aliens. E.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011); A Bill
To Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act To Limit Citizenship at Birth, Merely
by Virtue of Birth in the United States, to Persons with Citizen or Legal Resident
Mothers, H.R. 126, 111th Cong. § 1(a) (2009); Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R.
1868, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2009); Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong.
§ 3(a) (2007). These legislative efforts have varied in their details but generally provide
that the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” language of the Fourteenth
Amendment is fulfilled only if the child is born to a U.S. citizen mother or permanent
legal resident mother, a U.S. citizen father or permanent legal resident father who
meets additional criteria, or to an alien serving in the armed forces. See id. Other
proponents of denying birthright citizenship to the children of undocumented
immigrants, however, concede that the Fourteenth Amendment may indeed provide for
birthright citizenship to all children born in the United States (with some
aforementioned exceptions, see supra text accompanying note 10) and therefore call for
an amendment to the Constitution to exclude anyone not born to a U.S. citizen, legal
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of birthright citizenship, proponents have argued, incentivizes and
even rewards unauthorized immigration.12 Indeed, because U.S.
citizens over twenty-one years of age may begin the immigration
process for their alien parents,13 aliens could potentially immigrate
without authorization, have a child, and then wait for their
“anchor babies” to come of age and secure legal residency.14 The
proposed remedy is to deny the U.S.-born children of
undocumented immigrants citizenship in the United States based
on their parents’ lack of U.S. citizenship or status as a legal
permanent resident. Such a conception of citizenship derives from
jus sanguinis—the inheritance of citizenship through blood
(rather than through place of birth).
Though unsuccessful thus far, these proposals have
spurred vigorous debate on the original meaning and purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment. More broadly, and more
relevant to this article, however, they offer insight into the
popular conception of “membership” in the national community
and the mechanisms by which we select those members.15
Membership is an intuitive term—much of our ordering of the
universe depends on the notion of membership. We are
members of fitness clubs, farming cooperatives, and political
parties, among many other things, and our membership in
these institutions guarantees certain benefits. Members of
fitness clubs enjoy the right to use fitness club equipment.
Members of farming cooperatives have the privilege of
consuming the vegetables harvested by the cooperative.
Members also bear burdens and obligations. Fitness club
members pay dues and may be expected to act in accordance
with club rules, while farming cooperatives may expect
members to help raise crops, allow crops to be raised on their
own property, or buy a “share” of the venture.
permanent resident, or alien actively serving in the U.S. military. See Joint Resolution
Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of United States Relating to United
States Citizenship, S.J. Res. 2, 112th Cong. (2011).
12
See Jennifer Medina, Arriving as Pregnant Tourists, Leaving with American
Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/us/
29babies.html.
13
See Immigration and Nationality Act, sec. 1, § 201(b), 79 Stat. 911, 911
(1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)).
14
See Lacey, supra note 8. For many, this concern also extends to temporary,
though legal, visitors to the United States. Medina, supra note 12.
15
Michael Walzer’s seminal book, Spheres of Justice, analyzes justice in
various spheres, including the spheres of education, free time, kinship and love, and
what he refers to as “membership,” which here I have labeled citizenship or national
polity. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY xi-xv, 3, 31 (1983).
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Every organization, whether formal or not, has a
mechanism for selecting its members. Ideally, the mechanism
sorts those who are well-suited for membership in the
organization from those who are not. One way of doing that
would be to rely on a very individualized analysis of potential
members to determine whether each candidate will fulfill his
membership obligations, remain loyal to the organization, etc.
This, however, would be very time consuming in the case of a
large organization, whose representatives must make hundreds
or even thousands of membership decisions. Instead, individuals
responsible for making decisions about membership frequently
refer to factors that are more easily and quickly measured. For
example, a college might use an applicant’s high school grades
and aptitude test scores to determine whether the applicant is
likely to succeed in college. Although this is not a perfect
indicator of the candidate’s likely success, it is a useful proxy.
Legal rights are privileges for the members of a more
abstract “club.” The decision of whether and to what extent an
individual enjoys legal rights is ultimately a determination of
that person’s membership. The right to citizenship is no
different. Citizenship and its attendant benefits, as I explain in
this article, are the privileges of membership in the national
polity. Who gets citizenship and—perhaps more importantly—
who does not get citizenship shapes the meaning of citizenship
itself. Thus, the rules and proxies by which citizenship is
distributed warrant close analysis.
The calls for a move away from a territorial conception of
citizenship toward a status-based conception of citizenship
evidence a shift in the way legislators, scholars, courts, and
others understand membership and belonging. More abstractly,
the proposed shift from a territorial to a status-based approach
to citizenship implies an ongoing inquiry into the adequacy of
various proxies for membership. After all, there is nothing
magical about a child’s geographic location at birth or the status
of the child’s parents. In fact, they are, in the most genuine
sense, mere accidents of birth. Rather, we look to these proxies
to help us assess something more substantive but less
measurable: whether an individual “belongs.”
My purpose in this article is to analyze birthright
citizenship and proposals to deny citizenship to the U.S.-born
children of undocumented immigrants in the context of the
changing meaning of membership. While scholars have
vigorously debated the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment, none has examined jus soli and jus sanguinis as
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proxies for more substantive indicators of membership. Neither
have scholars evaluated those proxies’ effectiveness in
approximating the qualities for which they serve as proxies.
In this article, I argue that the move from a territorial
conception of citizenship toward a status-based conception of
citizenship parallels a broader trend in which courts and
legislators are decreasingly distributing rights and privileges
on the basis of territorial presence. I argue, however, that the
distribution of citizenship based on status (or more accurately,
parents’ status) fails to account for the substantive indicators of
membership and belonging for which territorial presence at birth
stands proxy. Although I concede that birthright citizenship, as a
whole, must be distributed based on proxies—after all, it is
impossible to evaluate an individual’s substantive eligibility
and desirability for citizenship at the moment of birth—I argue
that territorial presence, though imperfect, is a more accurate
indicator of membership than parents’ status. As I explain in
this article, rather than measure an individual’s substantive
indicators of membership, a status-based approach further
removes the membership inquiry from the substantive basis of
membership in the national polity. Moreover, a status-based
approach threatens to create a cast of modern-day “illegitimate”
children—children who, on account of their parents’ status,
remain outside the law of their birthplace despite their de facto
membership in the community.
To reach these conclusions, I begin with a discussion of
membership in Part I. I discuss several competing approaches
to membership employed in U.S. law, including a territorial,
status-based, and “post-territorial” approach.16 I draw attention
to the territorial and status-based approaches’ reliance on
proxies—namely, geographic location and status—to determine
membership and compare them to the post-territorial approach’s
more direct reliance on the individual’s actual ties to the
surrounding community and submission to the state’s imposition
of obligations and duties. I then briefly explore the trajectory of
courts’ distribution of membership rights to aliens in the United
States outside the context of citizenship to illustrate
territoriality’s generally waning hold on U.S. treatment of
aliens in favor of the post-territorial approach.

16

For a detailed discussion of this emerging post-territorial approach, see D.
Carolina Núñez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights and
Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 817, 818-27, 830-32 (2010).

2013]

FINDING MEANING IN BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP

841

In Part II, I examine citizenship law in the context of
the territorial and status-based approaches to citizenship. I
analyze the historical trajectory of membership approaches in
U.S. citizenship law, highlighting the strong role that the
territorial approach has played and continues to play. I discuss
court opinions that make individual determinations of U.S.
citizenship, as well as the legislative history and circumstances
surrounding categorical grants or rejections of citizenship.
Acknowledging courts’ and legislatures’ use of territorial presence
as a proxy for substantive indicators of membership, I distill the
substantive factors for which territorial presence has served as
a proxy in order to evaluate, in Part III, whether the territorial
model continues to effectively approximate those factors today.
Part III discusses the citizenship of children of
undocumented immigrants through the lens of the substantive
factors identified in Part II. I assert that these substantive
indicators of membership are generally better approximated by
looking toward a child’s country of birth rather than the status
of the child’s parents, especially in the context of undocumented
immigrants living in the United States. I acknowledge that the
use of a territorial model in the birthright citizenship sphere
defies the movement away from the territorial model described
in Part I. I argue, however, that in the birthright citizenship
sphere, where only the territorial or status-based models are
available for use, the territorial model best fulfills the mandates
of the post-territorial model. In essence, I propose that—perhaps
counterintuitively—the territorial model operates much like the
post-territorial model in the context of birthright citizenship.
I.

MEMBERSHIP

Perhaps more than any other legal construct, citizenship
captures the essence of membership. But membership
encompasses much more than citizenship. In fact, decisions
about membership inhere in most forms of social and legal
ordering. Membership is a powerful concept that shapes
individuals’ identity, underlies the conferral of benefits, and
influences the imposition of obligations.17
Much of our identity is tied to the concept of
membership. We are members of families, political parties,
professions, cultures, churches, and many other groups. Often,
17

Portions of Part II track and summarize my prior discussions of membership.
For a more detailed discussion, see Núñez, supra note 16, at 819-26, 830-31.
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when we introduce ourselves to others, we identify ourselves as
belonging to something. In different settings, we highlight
different memberships. An individual might be a lawyer at a
cocktail party, a city council member at a political convention, a
grandmother at a wedding, and a member of the Navajo tribe
at a meeting of the National Congress of American Indians.
Membership matters on a very personal level—it facilitates
and signals fundamental aspects of identity.
Beyond shaping an individual’s sense of identity and
belonging, the concept of membership has a very concrete effect
on the rights, privileges, and benefits that individuals receive.
Ultimately, decisions about who receives goods (tangible and
abstract) are decisions about membership. Members have
privileges that nonmembers lack. Fitness club members enjoy
access to fitness equipment, farming co-op members enjoy fresh
produce, and sports team members enjoy camaraderie and
competition. It is this access to membership privileges that
makes membership particularly appealing.
Membership, however, denotes more than benefits and
privileges; perhaps equally as important, membership also
implies an obligation. Fitness club members pay dues, farming
co-op members donate time and effort to raising crops, and
sports team members physically contribute to the team’s
efforts. Because membership benefits are reserved exclusively
for the members of their respective groups, individuals are
willing to undertake membership obligations.
Every club has a mechanism for selecting its members.
In some cases, membership may depend on an individual’s
similarity to other members of the club. For example, a shared
language or set of customs might be enough to secure membership
in a cultural club, while shared beliefs may secure membership in a
religious organization. Often, membership depends on the
likelihood of an individual undertaking and fulfilling her
membership obligations once she becomes a member. This,
however, can be difficult to predict. A credit card company, for
example, expects its cardholders—or members—to repay the
company for purchases they make with their credit card.
Because an individual’s actual future performance is impossible
to measure ex ante, member selection often requires reference to
factors that are more easily measured and that indicate the
individual’s likelihood of fulfilling her future obligations as a
member. The credit card company will review the candidate’s
financial history to determine whether she will, in the future,
pay her bills. This is not a direct measure of whether the
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candidate will actually pay her bills. Rather, the candidate’s
past payment history is a proxy—and usually a very accurate
proxy—for her ability to make future payments.
Legal rights and privileges are also benefits of
membership in particular, although more abstract, clubs.
Employees have access to workers’ compensation benefits,
adult citizens have voting privileges, and sixteen-year-olds may
obtain driver’s licenses. As with the more pedestrian examples
of membership discussed above, the act of including someone
also entails an inherent act of exclusion. The unemployed do
not enjoy workers’ compensation benefits, noncitizens may not
vote,18 and young children cannot drive. The process of sorting
members from nonmembers presupposes the existence of
nonmembers. Exclusion is a byproduct of inclusion.
Sorting members from nonmembers in the context of
legal benefits and rights can be especially challenging. Not only
is it difficult to define the club—or sphere of membership—to
which a legal privilege attaches, but it is nearly impossible to
measure whether an individual in fact displays whatever
characteristics or qualities are important to that sphere of
membership. For example, what qualities do we hope licensed
drivers will possess? Most would answer, among other things,
that all drivers should be law-abiding, possess good judgment,
be vigilant, and have the ability to remain focused. Since it is
impossible to know ex ante whether an individual will
exemplify those qualities while driving, the question becomes
what proxies will best approximate these qualities. Potential
proxies might include age, driving test score, or parental
certification of time spent driving under supervision, but none
will provide a perfect metric. These same questions arise in
every sphere of membership. What, exactly, should qualify an
individual as a member of the club that distributes the legal
right in question? Who is a member? Or, perhaps more
importantly, who is not? Should each individual be evaluated
separately to determine whether he should be admitted into
the club at issue? Is there a good way to measure an
individual’s fitness for membership?
When it comes to aliens’ access to rights and benefits,
several approaches to membership have evolved in the United
18

For an account of changing access to the voting franchise, see Pamela S.
Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1345, 1345 (2003) (“The history of right to vote [sic] in America is one of
expansion and contraction, of punctuated equilibria, rather than gradual evolution.”).
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States. These membership models provide a sorting
mechanism—a way of determining who is and who is not a
member—for the distribution of membership rights. Two
proxy-based membership models have historically played a
significant role in the distribution of rights. A territorial
approach to membership distributes rights and privileges
based on an individual’s geographic location, while a statusbased approach looks to an individual’s legal status (in this case,
immigration status). A third, less proxy-focused membership
model seems to be developing. Some courts are using what I have
elsewhere called a “post-territorial approach”19—that is, an
approach that looks to the underlying rationales of territoriality—
to distribute rights among individuals. All of these membership
paradigms are in tension with each other and arise in various
areas of U.S. law. It is against this background that the current
debate about citizenship for the children of undocumented
immigrants has unfolded.
A.

The Territorial Model: The Meaning of Place
1. Membership and Borders

The territorial model of membership draws the line
between members and nonmembers along the state’s borders.20
Individuals on the inside of the border belong, and those on the
outside do not.21 Strict territoriality ignores an individual’s
19

See supra note 17.
See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 6-8 (dividing approaches to the distribution
of constitutional rights into membership approaches, mutuality approaches, universality,
and “global due process”); Linda S. Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the
Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 390-92 (2007) [hereinafter
Bosniak, Being Here] (comparing the territorial and status-based models of membership);
see also WALZER, supra note 15, at 41-42; Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership:
The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L.
REV. 955, 1031 (1988) [hereinafter Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership].
21
Though this model appears simple in writing, it can be difficult to apply in
practice. It is not always clear where a state’s territory begins and ends. Guantanamo
Bay, for example, is not a part of the United States, but it is, for many important
purposes, controlled by the United States. The Supreme Court ultimately held that
Guantanamo Bay was sufficiently under U.S. control to extend habeas rights to enemy
combatants being held there. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Courts have also held that individuals who are
unquestionably inside U.S. borders are outside its borders for purposes of the
distribution of certain rights and privileges. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), an alien had arrived from abroad at Ellis Island in 1950 but
was denied admission to the United States on security grounds and detained at Ellis
Island for almost two years without a hearing. Id. at 208-09. When the claimant
argued that his detention was a violation of due process, the Supreme Court treated
20
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community ties, sense of identity, legal status, and ethnicity.
Simple in theory and predictable in its result, territoriality
merely asks whether an individual is present within the state’s
territory.22 Jus soli provides a good example of strict territoriality
and is particularly relevant to this article. Under jus soli,
individuals born within a state’s territory are citizens of the
state at birth.23 Mere presence within a state’s territory at the
moment of birth guarantees this right. In the United States, the
current application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause conforms to this territorial pattern. In fact, much of U.S.
law employs a territorial approach to the distribution of rights.24
For example, a territorial approach governs undocumented
children’s rights to public education in the United States.25
Under Plyler v. Doe,26 presence within the United States entitles
undocumented children to the same free public education that
their U.S.-citizen counterparts enjoy.27 In both the jus soli and
public education examples, an individual’s parentage,
immigration status, loyalty to the state, sense of identity,
likelihood of remaining within the state’s boundaries, and
ability and willingness to contribute to the state are irrelevant
to the inquiry. The only relevant inquiry is whether the
individual is physically present on U.S. soil at the time the
membership right at issue is distributed.
2. Territorial Presence as a Proxy
Territoriality’s apparent disregard for these and other
factors has raised questions about its rationale. Is mere
presence within a state’s territory a good enough reason to
count a particular individual as a member entitled to full
membership rights? Clearly, physical presence within a state’s
territory—standing alone, and viewed in the abstract—means
very little. Rather, being within a territory represents
something more meaningful—that is, physical presence within
him as if he had not yet set foot in the United States: “In sum, harborage at Ellis
Island is not an entry into the United States.” Id. at 213.
22
See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 394.
23
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24
See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 978 (2002)
(“[R]elatively little turns on citizenship status. The right to vote and the right to run
for federal elective office are restricted to citizens, but all of the other rights are written
without such limitation.”).
25
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
26
Id.
27
Id.
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a territory is a proxy for substantive traits and characteristics that
are desirable in a member. Commentators have offered several
possible indicators of membership for which territorial presence
serves as a proxy. Close analysis, however, reveals that territorial
presence is not a consistently effective measure for these possible
indicators of membership, especially in an increasingly globalized
world of cross-border communication and transactions.
a. Mutuality of Obligation
Territorial presence within a state’s boundaries might
serve as a proxy for an individual’s acceptance of jurisdiction
over her.28 The notion is that an individual, by being present
within a state’s borders, acknowledges the state’s exclusive right
to impose obligations upon her.29 This idea stems from
Westphalian sovereignty, in which a nation-state exerts complete
and exclusive jurisdiction over individuals within its territory.30
This territorial jurisdiction superseded the medieval practice of
overlapping fealty owed to feudal lords and ecclesiastical leaders.
In a Westphalian system, an individual owes duties to the state
rather than to individuals who might be geographically
distant.31 Thus, an individual’s location is the ultimate
determinant of her obligations.32
This territorial sense of jurisdiction requires a territorial
notion of membership, or so the argument goes, because a
nation-state must provide corresponding membership rights and
benefits to the individuals on whom it imposes obligations. That
is, the state owes individuals within its territory full
membership rights as a matter of mutuality of obligation
28

See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 108-09 (describing a conception of the U.S.
Constitution based on mutuality of obligation); Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 408.
29
See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 108-09.
30
Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 250811 (2005) (tracing territoriality back to the Peace of Westphalia).
31
For a piece challenging the conventional view that the Peace of Westphalia
single-handedly established a territorial world order, see Stéphane Beaulac, The
Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth, 8 AUSTL. J.
LEGAL HIST. 181 (2004).
32
See M.S. Janis, Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius, in
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 391, 393 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed., 1994)
(“The treaties of Westphalia enthroned and sanctified sovereigns, gave them powers
domestically and independence externally.”). In addition to the Westphalian
international norms that constrain a state’s ability to act outside of its borders,
practical considerations play an important role. Logistics and cultural and social
limitations all constrain the exercise of power beyond the state’s borders. See Gerald L.
Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 259, 269 (2009).
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because those individuals are subject to all of the duties imposed
by the state.
Although the mutuality-of-obligation rationale for
territoriality is sound in a formalistic sense, it does not account
for the modern reality that states sometimes impose
obligations on individuals outside their borders.33 The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),34 for example, prohibits U.S.
nationals living outside U.S. territory from engaging in certain
practices. Despite being geographically outside the United
States, individuals subject to the FCPA are nonetheless subject
to U.S. law.35 Strict territoriality also fails to account for the
practice of offering selective immunity to individuals within
state territory.36 Foreign diplomats are exempt from some of the
obligations the state imposes on other individuals within its
boundaries. In that sense, diplomats do not accept the host
state’s full jurisdiction over them by virtue of their mere
presence.37 In each of these scenarios, territorial jurisdiction does
not accurately describe the source of individuals’ obligations. As
a result of these incompatible situations, territoriality is an
inconsistent proxy for mutuality of obligation.
b. Community Ties
Others have argued that territorial presence is a proxy
for ties between an individual and the surrounding community.38
They argue that an individual is most likely to develop ties to
the institutions and individuals physically near her.39 These
33

Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1200-01 (1996).
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), d(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)).
35
Id.
36
See id. §§ 78dd-2 & 78dd-3; Raustiala, supra note 30, at 2510 (describing
the principle of sanctuary, where a location is “plainly within a prince’s territorial
realm yet into which secular law could not reach,” as an example of lapses in territorial
sovereignty). See generally Neuman, supra note 33.
37
See Raustiala, supra note 30, at 2510.
38
Joseph H. Carens, On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay, 30 BOS.
REV., Summer 2005, at 3, 16, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3/carens.php
(“Whatever their legal status, individuals who live in a society over an extended period
of time become members of that society, as their lives intertwine with the lives of
others there. These human bonds provide the basic contours of the rights that a state
must guarantee; they cannot be regarded as a matter of political discretion.”); see also
Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 404. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (2006) (describing an affiliations-focused approach to immigration
based on “the ties [immigrants] have formed in this country”).
39
Carens, supra note 38.
34
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ties, in turn, foster commitment and loyalty to the surrounding
community, and they increase the likelihood the individual will
contribute to that community. Likewise, the surrounding
community forms ties with the individual such that the
surrounding community depends on the individual’s membership.
This rationale for territoriality is intuitive, but it can
seem outdated in a modern world. After all, electronic
communication and ease of travel reduce the need for
interaction between individuals living in geographic proximity
and allow individuals to form strong ties across state
boundaries.40 In addition, the community ties rationale does not
parallel territoriality’s binary world of members and
nonmembers.41 Even assuming that territorial presence results
in affiliations between the individual and the surrounding
community, strict territoriality does not account for the varying
depth and type of ties any one individual might have to the
community. In a membership system truly based on community
ties, individuals with more numerous and significant
connections to the surrounding community would presumably
possess a stronger claim to membership rights than those who
have fewer and weaker ties.
Although territorial presence seems to intuitively correlate
with community ties such that territorial presence would be an
effective proxy for those ties, there are many situations, as
described above, in which that would not be the case.
c. Community Preservation
Territoriality might also help preserve the character of
the surrounding community.42 This rationale is also based on
the idea that territorial presence serves as a proxy for ties
between the individual and the surrounding community. It is
not, however, the individual’s fitness for membership that is at
issue under this rationale but rather the preservation of the
community’s egalitarian character.43 Scholars argue that excluding
40

For a critique of the relationship between proximity or “place” on the one
hand and identity and responsibility on the other, see Doreen Massey, Geographies of
Responsibility, 86B GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER 5 (2004), available at http://oro.open.ac.uk/
7224/1/geographies_of_responsibility_sept03.pdf.
41
See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 405-06.
42
The community preservation rationale has also been called the anti-caste
or anti-subjugation rationale. See id. at 392-95; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515 (2d ed. 1988).
43
See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 392-95.
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individuals within the community from membership would
create a subclass of nonmembers that would degrade the
community’s character.44 It is important to note, however, that
this rationale for territoriality is not one about fairness to
individuals. Instead, it is about the nature of the community.
In fact, under the community preservation rationale, unequal
treatment of individuals would not be justified, even by consent
of the affected individuals, because the community would
nonetheless suffer from the creation of a subclass.45
This argument in favor of territoriality is perhaps the most
appealing of the three discussed here. It suggests that, even when
territorial presence may not reflect mutuality of obligation or
community ties, inclusion may nevertheless be warranted because
exclusion might bring unwanted changes to a society.
B.

Membership Based on Status

Rights may also be distributed based on an individual’s
status with respect to the polity.46 Under this approach, citizens
enjoy all the rights and privileges offered by the polity, while
those without any legal status enjoy fewer rights and
privileges.47 In the United States, voting rights follow this
pattern: only citizens may vote, while others may not.48 The U.S.
welfare system also conforms to the status-based approach.49
Citizens have access to many benefits that legal permanent
residents do not enjoy, while legal permanent residents enjoy
more benefits than do tourists and other temporary visa holders.50

44

Owen Fiss has linked the Fourteenth Amendment to principles of
community preservation. The Amendment, he argues, is “a statement about how
society wishes to organize itself, and prohibits subjugation, even voluntary subjugation,
because such a practice would disfigure society.” Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah,
23 BOS. REV., Oct./Nov. 1998, at 5, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR23.5/Fiss.html;
see also Thomas Jefferson, Drafts of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 7 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1795–1801, at 303 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1896)
(“[T]he friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first
experiment; but the citizen will soon follow . . . .”).
45
See WALZER, supra note 14, at 62.
46
See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 6-7; Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 390.
47
Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 390.
48
For a description of a historical territorial-based approach to voting rights,
see Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current
Prospects for Change, 21 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 477, 479 (2000).
49
See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 528-31 (6th ed. 2008).
50
See id.
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The status-based approach to membership is also a
proxy-based approach. An individual’s status as a citizen,
standing alone, means very little. Rather, status is a measure
for something more meaningful. Status might represent the
polity’s consent to that individual’s participation in the
community or the individual’s willingness to abide by legal
norms.51 Status might also serve as a proxy for loyalty, community
ties, or sense of obligation to the state.
Unfortunately, status does not always provide an accurate
approximation of some of these factors. Like territoriality, the
status-based approach to membership relies on an imperfect
proxy. For example, a citizen is not necessarily more loyal than
a legal permanent resident. Likewise, a legal permanent
resident does not necessarily have more ties to the surrounding
community than does a long-time undocumented resident.
Thus, status is not a consistently effective proxy for these and
other more substantive indicators of membership.
C.

Post-Territoriality

As an alternative to proxy-based systems of rights
distribution, courts and legislatures have also distributed rights
under a more principled, functional approach.52 Rather than
referring to a proxy like territorial presence or status, courts and
legislatures can instead directly measure an individual’s ties to
the surrounding community, sense of obligation to the United
States, and other fundamental indicators of membership.53 I call
this a post-territorial approach because it values the rationales
underlying the territorial model while divorcing itself from a rigid
adherence to territorial presence. Post-territoriality is a
developing, potential successor to territoriality.54
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Boumediene v. Bush
serves as a useful example of the post-territorial approach.55
There, the Court held that Guantanamo Bay detainees had the
right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the
Constitution.56 Specifically rejecting the argument that the
detainees’ location outside U.S. territory excluded them from
51
52
53
54
55
56

See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 390.
See Núñez, supra note 16, at 842-47.
See id.
Id. at 848.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See id. at 770.
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petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court analyzed
several factors before arriving at its conclusion.57 The Court
focused on the actual power the United States exerted over the
detainees and the corresponding obligations the United States
must afford.58 In other words, the Court looked directly to
mutuality of obligation, rather than to a proxy for mutuality of
obligation, in order to determine the detainees’ membership for
purposes of habeas corpus review.
Cancellation of removal, the process by which an alien
facing removal from the United States may instead obtain
permission to remain as a permanent resident, provides an
example of a legislative use of the post-territorial approach.59
Under relevant law, an undocumented immigrant is eligible for
cancellation if, among other requirements, she has been
present in the United States for ten years, has been of good
moral character, and can show that removal would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying
relative in the United States.60 Rather than simply ask whether
the individual has the requisite status to remain in the United
States, the Immigration and Nationality Act focuses on more
direct measures of an individual’s membership, including ties
to the surrounding community and the extent to which the
community depends on the individual.61
D.

Aliens and Membership

For a U.S. citizen living in the United States, the
difference between the status-based approach and the territory57

See id. at 752 (“[N]o law other than the laws of the United States applies at
the naval station” even though Cuba retains technical sovereignty over Guantanamo.);
see also Neuman, supra note 32, at 259 (exploring Boumediene’s functional approach to
the extraterritorial application of the Constitution).
58
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769, 771 (contrasting de jure sovereignty with
practical sovereignty and finding that “[i]n every practical sense Guantanamo is not
abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United States” because the
detainees at issue “are held in a territory that, while technically not part of the United
States, is under the complete and total control of our Government”).
59
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 240A, 110 Stat. 3009-594 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b (2006)) (providing a mechanism by which removable aliens may remain in the
United States as legal permanent residents).
60
See id. § 240A(b).
61
The cancellation of removal statute admittedly uses proxies—length of stay
in United States, see id. § 240A(b)(1)(A), and hardship to U.S. relatives, see id.
§ 240A(b)(1)(D), for example—to measure membership. The cancellation statute,
however, is fairly characterized as post-territorial in nature because it rejects proxies that
are no longer useful in favor of a more textured analysis of the individual’s membership.
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based approach is merely theoretical. After all, whether it is
because of her citizenship or her presence within the United
States, the individual receives membership benefits. A U.S.
citizen in the United States is entitled, for example, to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, either because she is
present in the United States or because she is a U.S. citizen.
But for an alien, the decision of which membership paradigm
governs has a very palpable effect on the rights the alien enjoys.
For example, an undocumented immigrant in the United States
might find that her presence within the United States is simply
not enough to secure Fourth Amendment rights and that her
status precludes her from those rights.62 Similarly, for
individuals living outside the United States, the membership
model applied matters. Indeed, citizenship might secure a right
for an individual despite her absence from U.S. territory.
Thus, the applicability of U.S. law to aliens within the
United States and to individuals outside of the United States
provides two perfect fields in which to study the evolving
trajectory of membership models in the United States. An
examination of that trajectory reveals a trend away from strict
territoriality. As presence within the United States becomes
less accurate in reflecting an individual’s ties to the United
States, courts and legislatures are looking to other indicators of
membership. In some instances, legal status now secures a
certain right or privilege. In other instances, courts and
legislatures have attempted to directly measure an individual’s
community ties and sense of obligation to the United States. That
is, in some areas of law, the status-based approach is now
competing with the post-territorial approach to displace the
more traditional territorial model. As a result, presence within the
United States no longer guarantees certain membership rights,
and presence outside the United States does not necessarily
foreclose an individual from receiving membership rights.
The tension between competing membership paradigms
arises in a variety of spheres. In the labor and employment
context, for example, a status-based approach to worker rights
has slowly begun to displace the territorial model.63 The result
is a fractured system in which some courts tether rights to
62

See, e.g., United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D.

Utah 2003).
63

See generally Núñez, supra note 17, at 849 (arguing that under a postterritorial approach, undocumented immigrants are members of the employment
sphere entitled to all the rights and remedies available to documented workers).
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lawful immigration status or citizenship while others tie them
to territorial presence.64 This disconnect is apparent in Title VII
discrimination cases,65 state employment law and tort claims,66
and workers’ compensation claims.67
State legislatures have adopted different membership
models in their treatment of undocumented college students, as
well. Some states offer in-state tuition prices to all students
who are residents of the state, regardless of their immigration
status,68 while other states require in-state undocumented
64

For example, in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137
(2002), the Supreme Court held that an undocumented worker could not recover
backpay, wages that would have been earned but for an illegal termination, under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Id. at 159-60. The decision opened the door for
significant encroachment of a status-based approach into the labor and employment
law sphere. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
65
See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896-97 (S.D.
Tex. 2003). But see Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004)
(suggesting that Hoffman is not applicable to Title VII claims).
66
See, e.g., Garcia-Lopez v. Bellsouth Telecomm., No. 1:08CV1397-LG-RHW,
2010 WL 1873042, at *6 (S.D. Miss. May 7, 2010) (holding that an undocumented
immigrant’s lost wage and earning capacity claims are barred); Veliz v. Rental Serv.
Corp. USA, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334-35 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that the estate of
an undocumented worker injured in a work-related accident could not recover lost U.S.
wages against the forklift manufacturer); Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 473
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that a claimant’s lack of authorization to work
precluded both economic and non-economic damages for her illegal termination); see
also Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. 01-1241-JTM, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19780,
at *16-17 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003) (suggesting that an undocumented worker may be able
to recover lost wages, but only at the prevailing wage in the individual’s country of
origin); Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1002 (N.H. 2005). But see
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding
that undocumented status does not prevent a worker from recovering compensatory
damages for state employment law violations).
67
See, e.g., Xinic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir. 295 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005). But see Pontes
v. New Eng. Power Co., No. 0300160A, 2004 WL 2075458, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug.
19, 2004) (holding status is not relevant in worker’s compensation claim); Sanchez v.
Eagle Alloy, Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (limiting award of lost wages to
compensate only for time period during which employer did not know of employee’s
undocumented status); Cherokee Indus. v. Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798 (Okla. Ct. App. 2003)
(suggesting that undocumented status may render alien ineligible for specific remedy
of vocation rehabilitation or medical treatment by a specific doctor).
68
Thirteen states have enacted such laws: California, see CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 68130.5 (West 2002); Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-29 (2011); Illinois, see
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/7e-5 (2009); Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a
(West 2004); Maryland, see MD. CODE ANN. § 15-106.8 (West 2012); Nebraska, see NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-502 (West 2006); New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1
(2005); New York, see N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 355(h)(8) (McKinney 2012); Texas, see TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2001); Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (West 2002);
Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.15.012 (West 2003); Oklahoma (overturned in
2011), see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3242 (West 2007), invalidated by Thomas v. Henry, 260
P.3d 1251 (Okla. 2011); and Wisconsin (repealed in 2011), see WIS. STAT. § 36.27, repealed in
part by 2011 Wis. Legis. Serv. 32 § 994L (June 26, 2011). The Rhode Island Board of Regents
has adopted policies allowing undocumented students to pay in-state tuition at state schools,
though no legislative act requires it. See S. 5.0, R.I. Board of Governors for Higher Education,
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students to pay the higher, out-of-state tuition prices.69 States
have also differed on whether undocumented status should
foreclose students from enrolling in post-secondary state
schools at all.70
Another area in which the territorial model competes
with a status-based model lies in the debate over whether to
allow undocumented immigrants to apply for driver’s licenses.
A majority of states have now passed laws that require proof of
legal residency or citizenship in order to obtain a driver’s
license.71 A handful of states, however, continue to allow all
state residents, regardless of their immigration status, to apply
for some form of driver’s license.72
These examples highlight the waning importance of
territorial presence. Being here, alone, is not enough. From the
examples discussed above, it appears that a status-based
approach is quickly overtaking the previously dominant
territorial approach. The tension, however, between the
territorial model’s broad inclusivity of individuals within the
borders and the status-based model’s categorical exclusion of
undocumented immigrants has led to a post-territorial approach
in the sphere of constitutional law. Although territorial presence
once guaranteed protection under the Constitution, with little
explanation, recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that
something more substantive than territorial presence triggers
constitutional coverage.
For much of U.S. history, territorial presence weighed
heavily in the distribution of membership rights. Commentators

Sept. 26, 2011, available at http://www.ribge.org/residency1for2012.pdf; see also
Undocumented Student Tuition: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/
educ/undocumented-student-tuition-state-action.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
69
At least four states legislatures specifically foreclose undocumented
immigrants from in-state tuition prices: Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1803
(2006); Colorado, see COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-76.5-103 (2011); Georgia, see GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-3-66 (2008); and Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN. § 21-14-11 (West 2011). South
Carolina, Indiana, and Alabama also prohibit undocumented students from enrolling in
state postsecondary schools. See Undocumented Student Tuition, supra note 68.
70
South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-430 (2008); and Alabama, see
ALA. CODE § 31-13-8 (2011); 2011 Ala. Acts 535 § 8, also prohibit undocumented
students from enrolling in state postsecondary schools.
71
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3153(D) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 257.307 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 483.290 (West 2011).
72
Washington, New Mexico, and Utah allow undocumented immigrants to
apply for some form of a driver’s license. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-9 (West 2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-205(8) (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.20.021,
46.20.091 (West 2003).
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attribute this inclusive tradition to Yick Wo,73 where the
Supreme Court held that the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment “are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”74 Indeed, this
reasoning found favor in subsequent cases exploring the
Constitution’s application to aliens.75
Of course, the necessary corollary to a rule that distributes
rights based exclusively on presence inside the borders is the
denial of rights to individuals on the outside. Indeed, being
outside the United States has, for much of U.S. history, foreclosed
protection under many constitutional provisions.76 The
Constitution, as it turned out for those outside the border, could
“have no operation in another country.”77
More recently, this territorial approach to membership
has undergone a transformation toward post-territoriality.
Perhaps because territorial presence is not as accurate as it once
was in predicting community ties or an individual’s sense of
obligation to the surrounding community and polity, courts and
legislatures have begun to look past territorial presence to
more substantive factors. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,78 for example, suggested
that the Constitution only protects aliens who have “developed

73

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Id. at 369.
75
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222-23, 230 (1982) (holding that the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide public
education to undocumented children); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 23435 (1896) (extending the reasoning of Yick Wo to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
76
See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (holding that a sailor, whom the
court treated as a constructive U.S. citizen, employed on a U.S. merchant ship was not
protected by the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury). The Insular Cases,
which centered on whether the Constitution applied to U.S. territorial possessions such
as the Philippines and Puerto Rico, also provide good examples of the exclusionary side
of territoriality. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 139 (1904); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 198 (1903); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1,
2 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 222 (1901).
77
In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464.
78
494 U.S. 259 (1990). Justices Kennedy, White, O’Connor, and Scalia joined
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, but Justice Kennedy also submitted his own concurrence,
which diverged from the reasoning of the Court. As a result, courts and commentators
have questioned the precedential value of what amounts to a plurality opinion. See
Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1991); Randall K. Miller, The Limits
of U.S. International Law Enforcement After Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin,
58 U. PITT. L. REV. 867, 867 n.3 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909, 972 (1991).
74
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substantial connections with this country.”79 Territorial
presence, alone, was insufficient.80 The Court has also departed
from strict territoriality in cases focusing on individuals
outside the border—that is, absence from U.S. territory does
not necessarily foreclose an individual from constitutional
protection. For example, in Reid v. Covert,81 the Court held that
U.S. citizens living abroad and convicted of murder by a U.S.
military court were entitled to the right to a trial by jury after
indictment by a grand jury.82 In Reid, the Court rejected the
strict territorial approach of earlier cases in favor of a statusbased approach that focused on the individuals’ U.S.
citizenship.83 More recently, in Boumediene v. Bush,84 the Court
held that enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay were
entitled to the writ of habeas corpus and the protections of the
Suspension Clause.85 Enemy combatants were deemed “members”
for purposes of habeas corpus review, not because of status or
presence within U.S. territory, but because of a more substantive
concern with, among other things, providing protections to those
on whom the government imposes obligations.86 In evaluating
substantive indicators of membership rather than categorically
granting or denying rights based on territorial presence, Supreme
Court opinions show a trend toward post-territoriality.
The trend away from territoriality and toward postterritoriality suggests an increased focus on the substance of
membership. Though this trend represents an encouraging
move away from proxy-based systems of membership that are
both overinclusive and underinclusive,87 the trend toward postterritoriality has not yet been developed in the sphere of
citizenship law. And those who call for the abandonment of a
79

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 271-72 (“[T]his sort of presence—lawful but involuntary—is not of
the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country.”).
81
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
82
Id. at 32-33.
83
See id. at 5-6 (“[W]e reject the idea that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. . . . When the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the . . . Bill of Rights . . . should not be
stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”).
84
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
85
See id. at 2277.
86
See D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented
Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85 (2011) (arguing that
Boumediene was decided under a post-territorial paradigm that focuses on the
underlying rationales of territoriality).
87
See generally Núñez, supra note 17.
80
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territorial conception of birthright citizenship have not advocated
for a system of distributing citizenship that employs more
accurate measures of membership. Rather, they seek to replace
territorial presence with a different proxy: parents’ immigration
status. In the remainder of this article, I argue that, when it
comes to birthright citizenship, where inaccurate proxies are
unavoidable, territorial presence is the more accurate indicator
of membership and best fulfills the post-territorial objective of
accurate and fair inclusion.
II.

CITIZENSHIP AND TERRITORY

Citizenship in the United States is intimately related to
territory. Virtually all U.S. citizenship rules require a
connection to U.S. territory. Birthright citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,”88 is one of
the most territorial conceptions of citizenship in the industrialized
world. Even birthright citizenship rules for the foreign-born
children of U.S. citizens incorporate a strong territorial
component. In order to pass U.S. citizenship to their children born
abroad, U.S. citizen parents must have lived or been physically
present in the United States before the birth of the child.89 Thus,
even U.S. birthright citizenship based on blood or inheritance—
known as jus sanguinis—is strongly territorial in nature.
Naturalization laws also require a territorial connection to the
United States, with most immigrants being required to have a
continuous residence in the United States for the five years
prior to naturalization.90 Beyond the residency requirement,
naturalization rules also require an intending citizen to have
been physically present in the United States for at least two
and a half years before naturalization.91
88

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2006) (Two U.S. citizens may pass U.S.
citizenship to children born abroad if one of the parents “had a residence in the United
States” before the birth); id. § 1401(g) (A child born abroad to one U.S. citizen and one
alien is a U.S. citizen only if, before the birth, the U.S. citizen parent “was physically
present in the United States” for at least five years, two of which were after the parent
was 14 years old); id. § 1409(c) (A child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother is a
U.S. citizen only if the mother has been “physically present in the United States . . . for
a continuous period of one year.”).
90
See id. § 1427(a). Those who immigrate as the spouse of a U.S. citizen may
naturalize after three years of residency in the United States. See id. § 1430(a).
91
See id.
89
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Citizenship’s relationship to territory has not, as it has
in other aspects of U.S. law, given way to post-territoriality.
Rather, it seems that exactly the opposite has occurred. U.S.
citizenship began and evolved in the post-territorial climate of
the American Revolution, where boundaries—both territorial
and political—were shifting so profoundly that it was difficult
to tether citizenship to them. As boundaries solidified, so too
did citizenship rules.
Below, I explore several junctures in U.S. history in
which courts and legislatures asked the fundamental question—
who should be a citizen? I attempt to distill the substantive
factors that motivated the answers to this question in order to
evaluate, in Part III, the merits of using territorial presence at
birth as a proxy for membership today.
A.

The Birth of American Citizenship

The earliest U.S. citizens were those who became such
after the British colonies in America declared independence in
1776. With no clear rule demarcating the boundaries of
citizenship, courts struggled to identify whether and when these
individuals became U.S. citizens.92 What made a former British
subject a citizen? When did British subjects become citizens? As
courts sorted between citizens and noncitizens in the wake of the
Revolution, they did not conform to rigid rules. Instead, more
interestingly, courts looked to underlying rationales for the
concept of membership. And in the course of that evaluation,
an individual’s sense of allegiance to the United States and
community ties, as indicated by territorial presence, played an
important role.
1. Post-Revolution Citizenship Cases
Two Supreme Court cases, Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s
Snug Harbour93 and Shanks v. Dupont,94 specifically dealt with
the effects of revolution and U.S. independence on individual
citizenship. In both cases, the Court focused on U.S. inhabitants’
“right of election”—that is, the right of selecting one’s citizenship
92

I use “U.S. citizen” here to refer both to citizens of the individual states
and of the United States as a whole. Citizens of individual states, after all, were
citizens of the United States.
93
Inglis v. Tr. of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830).
94
Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
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in the wake of a revolution.95 An individual exercised her right of
election, not through a formal declaration, but rather through
allegiance to a country as apparent from her actions. The
Court’s decisions in Inglis and Shanks thus highlight some of
the methods by which courts measured an individual’s
allegiance and consequent citizenship.
In each case, the Court’s analysis followed a similar
pattern, although the application to each case’s details carried
some nuance. First, the Supreme Court addressed the individual’s
citizenship at birth under a simple jus soli rule.96 Second, the
Court determined whether the individual, during and after the
Revolution, had made an election to become a U.S. citizen.97 If
the individual was not of age at the time of the Revolution, the
Court assigned to the child whatever election the child’s parent
had made on the child’s behalf.98 In both of these steps,
territory played an important role; the location of an
individual’s birth and later residence weighed heavily in the
determination of citizenship.
a. John Inglis
In Inglis,99 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
John Inglis was not a U.S. citizen and therefore could not

95

Inglis, 28 U.S. at 121-22; Shanks, 28 U.S. at 255-56. See Respublica v.
Samuel Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 53 (1781) (describing the right of election as
available to individuals where one government “withdraw[s] from an old government,
and erect[s] a distinct one”).
96
See Inglis, 28 U.S. at 120-21; Shanks, 28 U.S. at 245.
97
See Inglis, 28 U.S. at 121-22; Shanks, 28 U.S. at 255-56.
98
In Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, Professor Mayton
suggests that the Court’s willingness to tie a child’s citizenship to his or her parent’s
citizenship evidences the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause original
meaning: as a jus sanguinis rule. William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the
Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221 (2008). While this article does not purport to
identify the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth noting
that the Court in post-Revolution citizenship cases does not purport to apply a jus
sanguinis citizenship rule. Rather, the Court specifically holds that birthright
citizenship is governed by the rule of jus soli. It is the child’s later election, which exists
only during times of revolution or other political schism, that may be tied to the parent.
That is, where the child did not have the capacity to legally make an election, the Court
held that the parent’s election would serve as the child’s election as well. This is an
important distinction in light of the factors the Court considered to determine the
parent’s election. In every case, the parent’s choice of residence was determinative. In
each case, the child lived with his or her parent. That is, the parent’s residence was
also the child’s. A strict jus sanguinis rule relies on the parent’s citizenship, which is
cast before a child is born and can be in a country to which a child has no physical
connection.
99
Inglis, 28 U.S. at 99.
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inherit real property located in the United States.100 Inglis was
born in New York sometime before 1779.101 In 1783, Inglis left
the United States with his father, an English royalist, for
England.102 Inglis remained in England for two years and then
took up residence in Nova Scotia, of which he became the
bishop under the Church of England.103
The Court recognized at the outset that the issue of
citizenship was not just a matter of long-established citizenship
rules:
This question as here presented, does not call upon the court for an
opinion upon the broad doctrine of allegiance and the right of
expatriation, under a settled and unchanged state of society and
government. But to decide what are the rights of the individuals
composing that society, and living under the protection of that
government, when a revolution occurs; a dismemberment takes
place; new governments are formed; and new relations between the
government and the people are established.104

First, the court began with the “universally admitted”
proposition that an individual born on American territory
subject to British rule was born a British subject.105 In essence,
the Court began with jus soli—that birth on British-governed
territory would result in British citizenship. Unfortunately, the
date of Inglis’s birth in New York was unclear. Since New York
had been alternately occupied by British and American forces
during the years when Inglis could have been born, the Court
could not ascertain whether New York was a British colony at
the time of Inglis’s birth.106
In any event, jus soli was insufficient to resolve the
issue of Inglis’s ultimate citizenship because, even if the British
had governed the colonies at the time of Inglis’s birth, a new
government controlled that same territory at the time of
Inglis’s ability to inherit property. A new dimension of jus soli
had to be explored—namely, whether jus soli ties an individual
100

Id. at 126-27. Because the date of John Inglis’s birth, which would have
revealed Inglis’s citizenship at birth (depending on who controlled the territory in
which Inglis was born), and Inglis’s age at the time when he could have made an
election (which would dictate whether Inglis could make his own election or merely follow
his father’s election), were uncertain, the Court reached this conclusion by evaluating the
outcome based on several different hypothetical birth dates. See id. at 126.
101
Id. at 102-03.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 120.
105
Id. at 120-21.
106
Id. at 120.
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to the territory of birth regardless of who exercises sovereignty
over that territory, or whether jus soli ties an individual to the
government that exercised sovereignty over that territory at
the time of birth.
The Court found that Inglis’s citizenship was not tied to
either. Rather, Inglis had a “right of election.” Inglis’s
nationality was not a mere function of formal legal rules, but
rather the result of his allegiance, as demonstrated by his
actions.107 Thus, the Court considered whether Inglis had, at
some point after birth, become (or, if he had been born while
his home was ruled by American forces, remained) an
American citizen:
The settled doctrine of this country is, that a person born here, who
left the country before the declaration of independence, and never
returned here, became thereby an alien, and incapable of taking
lands subsequently by descent in this country. The right to inherit
depends upon the existing state of allegiance at the time of descent cast.108

The Court finally concluded that, regardless of whether
the British controlled New York at the time of Inglis’s birth,
Inglis had ultimately become a British subject by leaving New
York for England and never returning.109 The Court also
suggested that Inglis may have been a British subject, rather
than an American citizen, before leaving the United States.110
107

Id. at 123. In his concurrence, Justice Story summed up this pragmatic,
post-territorial approach:
Under the peculiar circumstances of the revolution, the general, I do not say
the universal, principle adopted, was to consider all persons, whether natives
or inhabitants, upon the occurrence of the revolution, entitled to make their
choice, either to remain subjects of the British crown, or to become members
of the United States. . . . [E]ach case was left to be decided upon its own
circumstances, according to the voluntary acts and conduct of the party.
See id. at 159-60 (Story, J., concurring).
108
Id. at 121 (majority opinion).
109
Id. at 126-27. The Court analyzed Inglis’s “election” by considering three
hypothetical dates of birth: birth prior to the Declaration of Independence, birth after
the Declaration of Independence but prior to the later British occupation of New York,
and birth during the British occupation of New York. Id. at 126. If born prior to the
Declaration of Independence, Inglis was born a British subject and by leaving the
United States, he elected to remain a British subject. Id. If born after the Declaration
of Independence but prior to the subsequent British occupation, then Inglis would be
too young to make his own election and would be assigned his father’s election to be a
British subject. Id. If born during the British occupation of New York, Inglis was born a
British subject and elected to remain a British subject by leaving the United States. Id.
In any event, the Court noted, by ultimately leaving the United States and remaining
in Britain, Inglis had elected to abandon any U.S. citizenship he had. Id. at 127.
110
Id. at 126 (“[H]is infancy incapacitated him from making any election for
himself, and his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the right
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Inglis was likely too young to make an election during his time
in the United States, and Inglis’s father, who was a royalist,
would have elected British nationality for Inglis.111
b. Ann Shanks
An individual’s decision to remain in the colonies or
leave them proved equally important in Shanks.112 There, the
parties contested the citizenship of Ann Shanks both at the
time of her father’s death and at the time of the treaty with
Great Britain of 1794, which controlled whether her children
could inherit land in South Carolina.113
Shanks was born in South Carolina.114 Her father,
Thomas Scott, supported the American cause.115 In 1781,
Shanks married a British officer and later left South Carolina
for England with her husband in 1782.116 After Shanks’s marriage
but before her departure to England, Shanks’s father died.117 After
raising five children in England, Shanks died in 1801.
Justice Story, writing for the Court, concluded that
Shanks was a citizen of South Carolina at the time of her
father’s death,118 but she was not a U.S. citizen at the time of
the treaty.119 The Court focused on Shanks’s “election” and
“allegiance,” as evidenced by her voluntary residence in one
country or another.
With respect to Shanks’s citizenship on the date of her
father’s death, the Court viewed Shanks’s residence in South
Carolina as an important indicator of Shanks’s U.S. citizenship.
Noting that Ann’s father “adhered to the American cause,” the
Court reasoned,
There is no dispute that . . . Ann, at the time of the revolution, and
afterwards, remained in South Carolina until December 1782.
Whether she was of age during this time does not appear. If she was,

of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his minority; which never
having been done, he remains a British subject.”).
111
Id.
112
Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246-47 (1830).
113
Id. at 243.
114
Id. at 244.
115
Id. at 245.
116
Id. at 244.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 245.
119
Id. at 246-47.
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then her birth and residence might be deemed to constitute her by
election a citizen of South Carolina.120

That Shanks remained in the state of her birth when
she came of age was a strong indicator of Shanks’s allegiance to
that state. If she was not of age, then the evidence—that
Shanks’s father was an American supporter—suggested that
her father had nonetheless elected American citizenship for
Ann.121
According to the Court, the fact that Shanks had married
a British subject before her father’s death could not change her

120

Id. at 245.
Id. at 247. Justice Story explained, “If she was not of age, then she might
well be deemed under the circumstances of this case to hold the citizenship of her
father; for children born in a country, continuing while under age in the family of the
father, partake of his national character, as a citizen of that country.” Id. at 245.
Justice Story’s statement appears to be directly at odds with Justice Thompson’s
analysis in Inglis, decided in the same term as Shanks. In Inglis, Justice Thompson
had begun with the “universally admitted” proposition that “all persons born within
the colonies of North America, whilst subject to the crown of Great Britain, were
natural born British subjects.” Inglis v. Tr. of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 99, 120 (1830). Indeed, Justice Story, just a few paragraphs before referring to
Ann’s father’s citizenship, had confirmed Inglis to be the Court’s complete statement of
the relevant law. Shanks, 28 U.S. at 245 (“After the elaborate opinions expressed in the
case of Inglis vs. The Trustees of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour . . . upon the question of
alienage, growing out of the American Revolution; it is unnecessary to do more in
delivering the opinion of the court in the present case, than to state, in a brief manner,
the grounds on which our decision is founded.”).
While some have suggested that Justice Story’s assignment of American
citizenship to Shanks despite her birth in a British colony is an endorsement of jus
sanguinis, see, e.g., Mayton, supra note 98, at 222, an analysis of the specific facts in
the case suggest otherwise. The Court could not have meant to endorse a conventional
jus sanguinis rule of citizenship. If it had, then Ann could not possibly be a U.S. citizen.
After all, her father was born in South Carolina prior to the Revolution and his parents
were, in the best case scenario, born in the British colonies, and, in the worst case
scenario, born in Britain or elsewhere. Were jus sangunis or jus soli controlling, Ann’s
father would be a British subject (or a citizen or subject of whatever state his parents
belonged to). But in Shanks, the Court found that Shanks would have been a U.S.
citizen. This result was entirely a product of the doctrine of election, by which Shanks
had a choice of nationality. If, however, Ann was not competent to make a choice
because of age, then the Court would have to look to the father. Other than the place of
his birth (in a British colony), the only information the Court mentioned about
Shanks’s father was his political loyalty and his residence in South Carolina: “[H]er
father adhered to the American cause.” Shanks, 28 U.S. at 245. It seems then, that in
holding that Anne would have the citizenship of her father, the Court was not holding
that Ann inherited her father’s original citizenship, but instead Shanks inherited her
father’s election after the Declaration of Independence. This is very different from jus
sanguinis, which ascribes citizenship on individuals through blood lines. Shanks’s
“election” was a choice that she was entitled to make if competent to make the decision
and that her father was entitled to make if she was not competent.
121
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citizenship.122 Shanks’s association or legal ties to an individual
did not involuntarily strip her of her elected citizenship.123
On the question of Shanks’s citizenship after the date of
her father’s death, the Court concluded that Shanks had
ultimately become a British subject.124 Once again, voluntary
residence in a country was determinative. That is, although
Shanks’s marriage to a British officer did not dissolve her U.S.
citizenship, her later decision to move to Britain did: “[H]er
subsequent removal with her husband operated as a virtual
dissolution of her allegiance, and fixed her future allegiance to
the British crown.”125 Shanks’s decision to permanently leave
the United States was an important—if not controlling—
indicator of her election to relinquish U.S. citizenship.
c. Asa Kilham and Henry Gardner
The importance of an individual’s physical attachment
to territory heavily influenced the outcomes in several early
state court cases, as well.126 In 1806, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the claimant, Asa Kilham, who had
been denied the opportunity to vote on the ground that he was
an alien, was a citizen entitled to vote.127 Kilham was born in
Massachusetts in 1754,128 but in 1775, he departed to
Newfoundland.129 Nevertheless, he had always expressed
loyalty to the American cause.130 In fact, he had refused to fight
against the Americans during his return voyage to the United
122

Shanks, 28 U.S. at 246.
Of course, the Court’s dismissal of these arguments is also notable for its
implications on gender and citizenship. For a discussion of the historical effect of a
woman’s marriage on her citizenship, see Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian
American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405
(2005).
124
Shanks, 28 U.S. at 247.
125
Id. at 246-47. The Court also found that, even if Ann’s move to Britain was
not sufficient to dissolve her American Citizenship, it was, nonetheless, enough to
establish her election to be a British subject. Id. at 249.
126
See Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 236 (1806); Gardner v. Ward, 2
Mass. (1 Tyng) 244 (1805); Palmer v. Downer, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 179 (1801) (holding that
a Massachusetts native who left the U.S. after the commencement of the Revolution
and remained in British-ruled territory until his death became an alien); Moore v.
Wilson’s Admin’rs, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 406, 408-09 (1837) (“Besides, the complainant
has resided since 1780 within the United States, and has been twice married to
American citizens, and she therefore is not an alien.”).
127
See Kilham, 2 Mass. at 262 (opinion of Parker, J.).
128
Id. at 236 (reporter’s commentary).
129
Id.
130
Id.
123
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States at great personal expense.131 In 1780, Kilham arrived in
Massachusetts, where he joined the militia, attended town
meetings, and engaged in a trade.132 The court affirmed his
citizenship. “[H]e did not lose his rights as a citizen of the United
States,” the court found. “His absence from his country was
temporary, and was for the purpose of getting a livelihood.”133
Less than a year before, the Massachusetts court also
heard the case of Gardner v. Ward, in which the claimant’s vote
had been disallowed for the same reason as Kilham’s.134 There,
the court held that Gardner was a citizen despite a long absence
from the United States.135 Because Gardner returned to Salem,
“there having his domicile,” and joined in the American cause,
“he was, of course, a citizen of the United States.”136
2. Understanding the Meaning of Territory
At first glance, these early post-Revolution cases appear
to have been decided entirely on the basis of territorial
presence and therefore seem to offer little insight into why the
courts thought territorial presence was a useful metric for
sorting citizens from noncitizens. But the courts’ decisions did
not evaluate the individual’s history of arrivals and departures
from the United States in a vacuum. The courts also took note
of the individual’s (and his or her family’s) expressions of
loyalty to the United States. In Inglis, for example, the fact
that the claimant’s father was a royalist weighed against a
finding of U.S. citizenship.137 In contrast, the Court found that
Ann Shanks’s father supported “the American cause,” which
weighed in favor of finding U.S. citizenship on the date of her

131

Id. at 236-37. As a result of his refusal, the officers of the ship confiscated
his property. Id.
132
Id. at 237.
133
Id. at 262 (opinion of Parker, J.).
134
Id. at 262; Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 244, 244 (1805) (reporter’s
commentary).
135
Gardner, 2 Mass. at 247-48 (opinion of Sewall, J.).
136
Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted).
137
See Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 124
(1830) (noting that the claimant’s father was “as much a royalist” and “that no man
could be more so”); see also Kilham, 2 Mass. at 236-37 (noting the claimant’s frequent
expressions of “his attachment to his native country” and refusal to fight against
Americans); Gardner, 2 Mass. at 236 n.1 (commenting that the claimant had, during
his absence from the United States, loaned money to American prisoners).
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father’s death.138 In addition, the courts considered where the
individual raised his or her family, with the Shanks Court
specifically observing that Ann Shanks’s children had all been
born in England.139 This fact was an indication of her election to
eventually relinquish U.S. citizenship. The claimant’s integration
into the community also played a role in the courts’
determinations. In Kilham, the court noted the claimant’s work
as a carpenter, his voting history, and the fact that he was
believed by his neighbors to have been temporarily outside the
United States for legitimate purposes.140
Not surprisingly, these facts correspond to the
rationales of territoriality identified above in Part I.A.141 An
individual’s loyalty and willingness to support the American
cause are one side of the mutuality of obligation equation. As
an individual takes on obligations to a state, the state is
obliged to provide corresponding protections. Moreover, an
individual’s willing integration into a community evidences
community ties that ought to be recognized by continued
inclusion in that community. The facts that the courts
considered in these post-Revolution citizenship cases, combined
with their correlation with mutuality of obligation and
community ties, suggests that territorial presence served as a
proxy for these more substantive indicators of membership.
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment

The question of who should be a citizen resurfaced
during the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 Although
this article does not purport to explore in detail the original

138

See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 245 (1830) (stating that
Shanks’s father “adhered to the American cause” and therefore would have passed on
that character to Ann if she were not of age at the time of the Revolution).
139
See id. at 244 (observing that Shanks had left five children, all born in
England, at her death).
140
See Kilham, 2 Mass. at 237 (observing that the claimant had joined the
local militia in Massachusetts, worked in his trade there, had voted at town meetings,
and appeared to his neighbors to be genuine in his explanation for having been outside
of the United States for some time); see also Gardner, 2 Mass. at 236 n.1 (taking
account of the claimant’s continued connection with the United States during his
absence through an agent, his transaction of business in Massachusetts upon return,
and the community’s consideration of him as a citizen).
141
See supra text accompanying notes 22-44.
142
See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2893 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Reverdy Johnson) (“Who is a citizen of the United States is an open question.”).
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intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment,143 an
examination of the Amendment’s legislative history illustrates
the tenacity of territoriality within the concept of American
citizenship and highlights some of the substantive factors for
which territorial presence served as proxy.
The originally proposed Fourteenth Amendment did not
include any citizenship language.144 It was not until after House
adoption that Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan proposed a
citizenship clause during the Senate debate of the Amendment:
“[A]ll persons born in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
States wherein they reside.”145 Two concerns with the proposed
language arose: First, the language would make citizens of the
children of Chinese immigrants and “Gypsies.”146 Second, the
language would make citizens of Native Americans living in
U.S. territory.147 The discussion that surrounded these two
issues once again highlighted the underlying rationales for a
territorial approach to citizenship—a desire to recognize
mutuality of obligation, account for community ties, and avoid
the creation of a caste system.
1. Children of Gypsies and Chinese as Citizens
Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania, an objector to the
Amendment, assured that Gypsies were a threat to his state.
He described Pennsylvania’s struggle with
a certain number of people who invade her borders; who owe to her
no allegiance; who pretend to owe none; who recognize no authority
in her government; who have a distinct, independent government of
their own—an imperium in imperio; who pay no taxes; who never
perform military service; who do nothing, in fact, which becomes the
citizen . . . . They wander in gangs in my state. . . . If the mere fact of
being born in the country confers that right, then they will have it;
and I think it will be mischievous.148

143

For analyses of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning, see Garrett
Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History,” 2010 AM. U. L. REV. 331 (2010);
Mayton, supra note 98.
144
See Epps, supra note 143, at 353.
145
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Jacob
Howard).
146
Id. at 2890-91 (remarks of Sen. Edgar Cowan).
147
Id. at 2894 (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
148
Id. at 2890-91 (remarks of Sen. Edgar Cowan).
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In essence, Senator Cowan described a group of people
whom he perceived to be unwilling to subject themselves to
U.S. sovereignty and therefore undeserving of citizenship.
Though his remarks were undoubtedly colored by racial
stereotypes, which he frequently articulated,149 his objection
squarely raised questions of mutuality of obligation.
The Chinese, argued Senator Cowan, were unfit for
citizenship on account of being of “a different race, of different
religion, of different manners, of different traditions, different
tastes and sympathies.”150 Senator Cowan expressed concern for
the State of California, believing the Chinese “may pour in
their millions upon our Pacific coast in a very short time.”151
“[I]s it proposed that the people of California are to remain
quiescent while they are overrun by a flood of immigration of
the Mongol race? Are they to be immigrated out of house and
home by Chinese? I should think not.”152
Senator John Conness of California, a proponent of the
Amendment, agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment, as
drafted, would indeed make citizens of the U.S.-born children

149

See, e.g., id. at 2891 (suggesting that citizenship should be open to people
of the same “blood and lineage, people of the same religion, people of the same beliefs
and traditions,” and referring to the white race as “the strongest”).
150
Id.
151
Id. Interestingly, in these comments, Senator Cowan raised some of the
same arguments that current proponents of a restrictive reading (or repeal) of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause have raised: that a territorial conception of
birthright citizenship would allow people to immigrate in alarming numbers, that
immigration would be hard to control, and that U.S. culture would be detrimentally
affected. See Julia Preston, Citizenship From Birth Is Challenged on the Right, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/us/
politics/07fourteenth.html (quoting Senator Graham, a proponent of proposals to deny
citizenship to the children of undocumented immigrants: “We can’t just have people
swimming cross the river having children here—that’s chaos.”); Marc Lacey, Birthright
Citizenship Looms as Next Immigration Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/politics/05babies.html (quoting
Representative Duncan Hunter: “We’re just saying it takes more than walking across the
border to become an American citizen. It’s what’s in our souls.”); Sandhya Somashekhar, GOP
Push to Revise 14th Amendment Not Gaining Steam, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/07/AR2010080702605.html
(discussing the sentiment that territorial birthright citizenship fuels increasing undocumented
immigration). The parallel is even more striking in the rhetoric used outside mainstream
media. See, e.g., Joe Guzzardi, Ending Birthright Citizenship Should be a Top Priority
for Congress, GOPUSA.com (Jan. 14, 2013, 6:33 AM), http://www.gopusa.com/
commentary/2013/01/14/guzzardi-ending-birthright-citizenship-should-be-a-top-priorityfor-congress/ (“Many of these children will grow up without traditional American
values, struggle to learn English, perform indifferently in school and only marginally
contribute to society. Eventually, the U.S. could lose control over its demographic future.”).
152
Id. at 2890-91.
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of Chinese immigrants and Gypsies.153 In response to Senator
Cowan, he retorted,
I beg the honorable Senator from Pennsylvania, though it may be
very good capital in an electioneering campaign to declaim against
the Chinese, not to give himself any trouble about the Chinese, but
to confine himself entirely to the injurious effects of this provision
upon the encouragement of a Gypsy invasion of Pennsylvania. I had
never heard myself of the invasion of Pennsylvania by Gypsies . . . .
. . . I have lived in the United States for now many a year, and
really I have heard more about Gypsies within the last two or three
months than I have heard before in my life.154

Senator Conness explained that, although the Chinese
“are not regarded as pleasant neighbors,”155 they are
docile, industrious people . . . . They are found employed as servants
in a great many families and in the kitchens of hotels; they are found
as farm hands in the fields; and latterly they are employed by
thousands . . . in building the Pacific railroad. They are there found
to be very valuable laborers, patient and effective.156

Senator Conness’s remarks encapsulate the community ties
rationale for territoriality. Chinese residents were an integral
part of the community, at least with respect to the economy,
and therefore were not to be excluded as nonmembers.
Later, Senator Conness summed up why the U.S.-born
children of Chinese immigrants should be regarded as citizens
of the United States, entitled to all the rights and privileges
afforded to citizens. He described the plight of the Chinese, who
had been the subject of numerous anti-Chinese laws in
California, including a prohibition on Chinese individuals
testifying in court:
The Chinese were robbed with impunity, for if a white man was not
present no one could testify against the offender. They were robbed
and plundered and murdered, and no matter how many of them
were present and saw the perpetration of those acts, punishment
could not follow, for they were not allowed to testify.157

Here, Senator Conness raised a community preservation
argument: he maintained that the Chinese should be afforded
birthright citizenship because they would become a subclass of
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 2892 (remarks of Sen. John Conness).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the American population if they were not eligible for citizenship.
Citizenship for everyone born within the territory would create a
just, egalitarian society.
After the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, the Supreme
Court relied on a mutuality of obligation rationale in reaffirming
the inclusion of Chinese children born in the United States within
the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause. In
United States v. Wong Kim Ark,158 the Supreme Court explained
that a child born in the United States to alien parents was
nonetheless a U.S. citizen because that child was born subject to
U.S. power and therefore must be extended the corresponding
protections of citizenship. “By this circumstance of his birth,” the
Court reasoned, “he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which
is claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land; and
becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that
sovereign, and to the other rights and advantages which are
included in the term ‘citizenship.’”159
2. American Indians as Noncitizens
The question of American Indian citizenship received
more attention than the question of Chinese and Gypsy
citizenship in the debates preceding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although there was apparent agreement
that American Indians living under tribal rule should not be U.S.
citizens, there was less certainty about how best to achieve that
result. Senator James R. Dolittle of Wisconsin proposed that the
Fourteenth Amendment include an exception from citizenship
for “Indians not taxed,” who, under identical language in the
1787 Constitution, were not counted for purposes of
Congressional representation or tax apportionment.160 Senator
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who had sponsored the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, took the floor to explain that the phrase
was not necessary. Indians were not within the jurisdiction of
the United States, he argued, because they were not subject to
U.S. law:
Can you sue a Navajoe Indian in court? Are they in any sense
subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States? By no
means. We make treaties with them, and therefore they are not
158

169 U.S. 649 (1898).
Id. at 663 (quoting Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 244, 244 n.1 (1805)).
160
See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2894 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
James Dolittle).
159
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subject to our jurisdiction. If they were, we would not make treaties
with them. . . . Do we pass a law to control them? Are they subject to
our jurisdiction in that sense? Is it not understood that if we want to
make arrangements with the Indians to whom he refers we do it by
means of a treaty?
....
. . . We cannot make a treaty with ourselves; it would be
absurd.161

For Trumbull, American Indians were effectively
outside of U.S. territory. In fact, when asked whether American
Indians were outside of U.S. jurisdiction merely as a “matter of
pleasure on the part of the Government,” Senator Trumbull
compared Indian territory to a foreign country. The United
States could impose U.S. law on Indian tribes only to the extent
it could “extend the laws of the United States over Mexico and
govern her.”162 But American Indians who had left their lands
posed a different question: “If they are there and within the
jurisdiction of Colorado, and subject to the laws of Colorado,

161

See id. at 2893 (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull). It was in this dialogue
that Senator Trumbull defined “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as “not owing
allegiance to anybody else,” id. at 1866, which commentators have since wielded in
defense of a restrictive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship
clause. See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 98, at 244-46. Trumbull, however, was speaking
only of Indian populations, whom he viewed as quasi-separate polities:
We have had in this country and have to-day, a large region of country within
the territorial limits of the United States, unorganized, over which we do not
pretend to exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild tribes of
Indians roam at pleasure, subject to their own laws and regulations, and we
do not pretend to interfere with them.
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2894 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
Senator Howard, also shared that sentiment:
They have a national independence. They have an absolute right to the
occupancy of the soil upon which they reside . . . . We have always recognized
in an Indian tribe the same sovereignty over the soil which it occupied as we
recognize in a foreign nation of a power in itself over its national domains.
Id. at 2895 (remarks of Sen. Jacob Howard).
162
Id. at 2894. Senator Fessenden nonetheless maintained that Congress
could enforce its laws in Mexico. Id. (remarks of Sen. William Fessenden). Senator
Trumbull supposed that Congress could do so only if it had the physical power to
enforce those laws, though it would be a “breach of good faith” to do so to Mexico and a
breach of treaties to do so to American Indians. Id. (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
The acknowledgement that having power to enforce laws is one component of
“jurisdiction” finds support in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene, in which the
Court’s functional approach considered the ability to enforce law as a component of de
facto sovereignty over a territory. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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they ought to be citizens; and that is all that is proposed.”163
Ultimately, Senator Trumbull’s reasoning—which corresponds
squarely to the mutuality of obligation rationale for
territoriality—prevailed, and the “Indians not taxed” language
was not adopted.164
The Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment just as Senator Trumbull had proposed—as
excluding American Indians. In Elk v. Wilkins, the Court held
that American Indians were not citizens at birth because they
were born members of an independent political community and
owed allegiance to individual tribes.165 Justice Gray, writing for
the majority, referred to Indian tribes as “alien nations,
distinct political communities” whose members “were not part
of the people of the United States” at the time of the drafting of
the Fourteenth Amendment and who the United States could
not impose obligations on.166 Indian tribes, in some respects,
were not part of U.S. territory, and their members thus were
not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, as
required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause.167
C.

Indian Citizenship After the Fourteenth Amendment

Although American Indians were outside the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment, they were the subjects of a series
of federal legislative acts that granted American Indians
citizenship in a piecemeal fashion. Many American Indians
gained citizenship through the Dawes Act.168 The Dawes Act
allowed the federal government to divide tribal land and grant
it to individual tribe members.169 With the individual grant of
land, the government essentially dissolved tribal sovereignty
over that land, effectively incorporating it into U.S. territory.
163

CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2893 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Lyman

Trumbull).
164

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
166
Id. at 99-100.
167
Id. at 109-10. Justices Harlan and Woods dissented on the grounds that
the claimant was a U.S. citizen because he had severed relations with his tribe and had
“surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States” by “becoming . . . a bona
fide resident of the State of Nebraska.” Id. at 120-21 (Harlan & Woods, JJ., dissenting).
The majority, however, noted that it was birthright citizenship that was at stake and that
the individual’s condition at birth was what mattered. Id. at 102-03 (majority opinion).
168
Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)).
169
See id.
165
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In return for the subjection to U.S. law, the Dawes Act made
citizens of any American Indian granted land under its
provisions.170 During the Senate debates, important themes
regarding territoriality resurfaced. The Senators expressed
concern over notions of mutuality of obligation, community ties,
and community preservation.
First, proponents were interested in subjecting
American Indians to U.S. law and allowing them to protect
their individual grants of land through access to courts.
Senator Maxey, who strongly supported granting citizenship
with each allotment, argued that granting citizenship was an
important protection that must accompany the grant:
“[Citizenship] gives the Indian holding land in severalty a place
in the United States courts to vindicate his right to his land and
protect himself in the enjoyment of his land.”171 Without
citizenship, American Indian land owners would be at the mercy
of U.S. law without access to the protections of citizenship.
Second, proponents of the Dawes Act felt that an
allotment of land would bring American Indians into the
“civilized life.” Though racially charged, this discussion
amounted to an evaluation of the likelihood that an allotment
of land would result in an individual’s integration within the
surrounding community.172
Finally, proponents of the Dawes Act were concerned
with the negative effects of denying citizenship to American
Indians who were living among citizens. Such a distinction
between American Indians and white citizens would lead to the
subjugation of the American Indians. Senator Chace observed,
I confess that I am at a loss to understand how gentlemen reconcile
to themselves and to their own sense of right and justice that
anomalous condition that the people of the United States have
occupied so long toward the Indian tribes. How with our system of
laws, based as it is upon the Declaration of Independence, which
announces “that all men are created equal,” that they are endowed
“with certain inalienable rights, . . .” this people can go on generation

170

See id.
17 CONG. REC. 1627, 1633 (1886) (remarks of Sen. Samuel Maxey).
172
See, e.g., id. at 1632 (remarks of Sen. Henry Dawes) (“[The Act] is to make
citizens of the United States of those Indians and those only who have . . . adopted the
habits of civilized life.”); id. (“[W]e do it in order to encourage any Indian who has
started upon the life of a civilized man and is making the effort to be one of the bodypolitic in which he lives.”).
171
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after generation holding in subjection this handful of a race of
men . . . .173

Senator Maxey joined in Senator Chace’s concerns and
added that a system that denied citizenship to American
Indians while at the same time granting citizenship to
similarly situated white individuals would be detrimental to
everyone.174 He compared the potential grant of citizenship to
American Indians to the grant of citizenship to prior slaves:
The policy of the United States Government when they liberated the
slaves was first to make them citizens . . . . [A]nd why? Because they
were not isolated, they were not dissociated, they were not separated
from the white citizens of this country; but they were mixed among
them, they were our neighbors. As long as we and our
descendants . . . shall live in this country, just that long will the
colored man and his descendants live in this country, and their
fortunes, their destinies will run side by side with ours.
. . . [T]he better educated the colored man is the more he
respects himself, the better citizen he makes, and the better it will
be for both colored and white.175

It was not until 1924 that Congress passed a broad
grant of citizenship to Native Americans born “within the
territorial limits of the United States.”176
The examples of judicial and legislative grants of
citizenship discussed in this section demonstrate the
importance of mutuality of obligation, community ties, and
community preservation in the citizenship inquiry. These
examples show that an individual’s presence within U.S.
territory has played an important role in determining whether
those factors would be well served by a grant of citizenship.
Having isolated the factors that historically played important
roles in the concept of citizenship, one question remains: How
can we best account for those factors today? Does a territorial
conception of birthright citizenship effectively account for
them? Would a status-based approach be more effective today?
In Part III, I use the factors—the substantive indicators of
membership distilled in this part—to evaluate the efficacy of
the territorial and status-based membership models in the
specific context of birthright citizenship.
173

Id. at 1633-34.
Id. at 1634 (remarks of Sen. Maxey).
175
Id.
176
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)).
174
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FINDING MEANING IN CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP BY
PROXY

It is interesting that, in the realm of birthright
citizenship, U.S. law has adhered to a very territorial
membership model despite the broader trend toward the more
nuanced, substantive measure of membership offered by postterritoriality. Certainly, presence in the United States at birth
does not necessarily ensure that the individual bears whatever
characteristics or qualities are desirable in a citizen.
Territoriality remains, however, the primary model that
describes the U.S. approach to birthright citizenship.
Of course, the failure of post-territoriality to filter into
birthright citizenship rules makes intuitive sense. Undertaking
a substantive evaluation of the community ties, loyalty, and
sense of obligation of every individual born with some claim to
U.S. citizenship would be impractical. In fact, it would be
impossible, since very little beyond a person’s physical and
genetic qualities and physical location can be discerned about a
person at birth. As a result, territory has persisted as a proxy
for more substantive indicators of membership.
The only possible alternative to the territorial model, in
light of the limited information known about a child at birth,
evaluates the qualities or status of the parents. Because a
substantive evaluation of all parents giving birth to children in
the United States is impractical, distribution of citizenship
based on parents’ citizenship is the only viable alternative to
territoriality in the birthright citizenship context. In this part,
I argue that territoriality is the appropriate model to apply to
children of undocumented immigrants. For these children,
territorial presence at birth remains an effective proxy for more
substantive indicators of membership.
The underlying principles I identified earlier in this
article have persisted through various historical iterations of
the question of who should be a citizen. That is, courts and
legislatures have consistently focused on mutuality of
obligation, community ties, and the need to preserve an
egalitarian polity by avoiding the creation of a caste system. I
propose that the same questions should be asked about the
children of undocumented immigrants in order to evaluate
whether a territorial conception of birthright citizenship
remains an effective mechanism for distributing citizenship
rights. Are these individuals subject to the obligations and
burdens of U.S. law in a way that suggests they should be
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offered corresponding protections? Do the children of
undocumented immigrants have significant ties to their
surrounding communities? Would a denial of citizenship to the
children of undocumented immigrants alter the nature of the
national community?
A.

Mutuality of Obligation

With respect to mutuality of obligation, the answer is
easy. From birth, the children of undocumented immigrants
are very much subject to the obligations and burdens of U.S.
law merely by their presence within the territory. Indeed, even
their parents, who have no legal status in the United States,
are likewise subject to those obligations. For example,
residents, whether authorized or unauthorized, must register
for selective service in the armed forces.177 Residents must also
pay taxes, including state sales tax, income tax,178 and social
security tax.179 Residents must obtain marriage licenses to
marry, driver’s licenses to drive, and business licenses to
conduct business.
Opponents of birthright citizenship based on birth
within U.S. territory might argue that undocumented
immigrants do not, in fact, comply with these obligations.
Frequently, for example, commentators raise undocumented
immigrants’ alleged failure to pay taxes as an important
177

See 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (2011); see also Fast Facts: Who Must Register,
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYS., http://www.sss.gov/FSwho.htm (last updated Apr. 11, 2013).
Unlike individuals present in the United States as students or tourists, who do not
have to register, immigrants who have taken up residency in the United States before
turning twenty-six must register. See id.
178
In fact, though U.S. law distinguishes between resident and nonresident
aliens by allowing nonresident aliens to pay taxes only on their U.S. source income at a
rate negotiated by treaty with the alien’s home country, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 871, 894
(2011); see also Alien Taxation—Certain Essential Concepts, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/
Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Alien-Taxation---Certain-Essential-Concepts (last
updated Aug. 2, 2012), most undocumented immigrants are considered resident aliens
by virtue of their long-term presence in the United States. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii). They therefore must pay income tax under the same rules that
govern citizens living in the United States. See id.; see also IRS, Determining Alien Tax
Status, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Determining-Alien-TaxStatus (last updated Aug. 18, 2012); Substantial Presence Test, I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Substantial-Presence-Test
(last updated Aug. 18, 2012).
179
Only non-resident aliens can be exempt from social security. Anyone
employed in the United States must pay social security tax. See Aliens Employed in the
U.S.—Social Security Taxes, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/InternationalTaxpayers/Aliens-Employed-in-the-U.S.-%E2%80%93-Social-Security-Taxes (last updated
Aug. 2, 2012).
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consideration in any debate about immigration or citizenship.
This, these commentators might argue, should weigh against
U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants gaining
citizenship at birth, since their parents have demonstrated a
deliberate decision not to subject themselves to U.S. law. In some
sense, the argument is one about an “election” of the type
discussed in post-Revolution cases180—undocumented immigrants
elect alien status for their children by failing to pay taxes. This
argument, however, fails on several grounds. First, there is
much evidence that undocumented immigrants do pay taxes.181
Second, an individual who does not pay taxes remains subject
to U.S. law and penalties, including fines and imprisonment,
which exist to enforce those laws. Third, the failure to pay
taxes cannot seriously be considered a rejection of U.S.
citizenship on behalf of the child when so many other
indicators suggest that the parents have elected membership in
the United States for their children. Those same parents have
borne their children in the United States, raised them in the
United States, sent them to U.S. schools,182 and supported them
by working in the United States.183
Another argument against considering an individual’s
subjection to U.S. law as a factor in citizenship determinations
is that, under the logic of the mutuality of obligation rationale,
virtually all residents, including undocumented immigrants,
should immediately be granted citizenship. But this argument
fails to consider that, first, this article discusses birthright
citizenship. Assuming the desirability of birthright citizenship
rules, I argue that a territorial conception of birthright
citizenship most accurately measures, at birth, the substantive
qualities that underlie American notions of citizenship. As a
result, I only analyze these factors with respect to individuals

180

See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., John Lantigua, Illegal Immigrants Pay Social Security Tax, Won’t
Benefit, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/
2017113852_immigtaxes29.html.
182
Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229-30 (1982) (holding that undocumented
children are entitled to the same free public education that their documented
counterparts and citizens are entitled to).
183
Of approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants, 7.2 million are in
the labor force, accounting for about 4.9% of the U.S. workforce. Broken down by
gender, 94% of undocumented immigrant men and 54% of undocumented immigrant
women work in the United States. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. (2006),
available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
181
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born in the United States.184 Second, I do not propose that
citizenship be granted to the children of undocumented
immigrants based solely on their being subject to U.S. law at
birth. As I argue below, their likelihood of developing ties to
the surrounding community, as well as the risk that denying
them citizenship will harm the national community, weighs in
favor of granting birthright citizenship.
B.

Community Ties

At birth, children have no meaningful community ties.
They have no social ties or economic ties.185 Their first
relationships are formed with the people who care for and feed
them—their family. For the children of undocumented
immigrants, however, birth in the United States is predictive of
their development of community ties in the same way that—or
perhaps even more than—it does for the children of authorized
residents and citizens. Like the children of U.S. citizens in the
United States, the children of undocumented parents are
required and entitled to attend school.186 And like the children
of U.S. citizens, the children of undocumented parents are
likely to remain in the United States.187 Of course, some might
184

Immigrants, documented and undocumented, are instead subject to
naturalization rules. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et seq. I would argue that the same
principles, including mutuality of obligation, should guide the formulation of
naturalization rules.
185
As a result, many commentators have treated children as prospective
citizens rather than actual citizens at birth. See, e.g., DAVID CUTLER & ROGER FROST,
TAKING THE INITIATIVE: PROMOTING YOUNG PEOPLE’S INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC
DECISION-MAKING IN THE UK 8 (2001); Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough,
Introduction, in CHALLENGING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
GENDER, EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 12 (Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough
eds., 2000); Michael Wyness et al., Childhood, Politics and Ambiguity: Towards an
Agenda for Children’s Political Inclusions, 38 SOCIOLOGY 81, 82 (2004); see also Ruth
Lister, Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children?, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN LAW 693 (2007).
186
See Issues & Research: Compulsory Education: Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/compulsoryeducation-overview.aspx (discussing state compulsory education laws). The requirement
and obligation would exist regardless of citizenship. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (holding that all children, including undocumented children, must be offered the
same free public education under the Fourteenth Amendment).
187
Several studies show that geographic mobility is directly correlated with
education levels and income. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICAN MOBILITY: WHO
MOVES? WHO STAYS PUT? WHERE’S HOME?, available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
files/2011/04/American-Mobility-Report-updated-12-29-08.pdf (last updated Dec. 29, 2008).
This would suggest that undocumented immigrants, who generally have little
education and a low income, see JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, A PORTRAIT OF
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES iv (Apr. 14, 2009), available at
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argue that if those same children were denied citizenship—that
is, if they had no status in the United States—they would be
less likely to remain in the United States. Research shows,
however, that undocumented immigrants tend to remain in the
United States for long periods of time.188 Moreover, because the
Department of Homeland Security currently focuses on the
deportation of “criminal aliens,”189 unauthorized immigrant children
would be unlikely to face deportation. Of course, the longer U.S.born children remain, the more likely they are to develop greater
ties to individuals and institutions in the United States.
C.

Community Preservation

Finally, a strong argument exists that the denial of
birthright citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants
would inject an effective caste system, colored by issues of race
and culture, into U.S. law and society. Many commentators
have suggested that this concern alone weighs in favor of an

http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (finding that “[a]dult unauthorized
immigrants are disproportionately likely to be poorly educated” and that the “median
household income for unauthorized immigrants was $36,000, well below the $50,000
median household income for U.S.-born residents”), would be less likely to move their
families (whether it included citizen or alien children) out of the United States. This is
especially so given the current bars to admissibility that are triggered by long
unauthorized stays in the United States. Unauthorized presence for a continuous
period of one year or more renders that individual, should she leave the country,
ineligible to return to the United States for ten years. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
188
PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS: LENGTH OF RESIDENCY,
PATTERNS OF PARENTHOOD 3 (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/
files/2011/12/Unauthorized-Characteristics.pdf. The Pew Hispanic Center reports that
approximately 63% of undocumented immigrants have lived in the United States for at
least ten years, and 35% have been in the United States for at least fifteen years. See
id. Only 15% of the undocumented immigrant population has been in the United States
for less than five years. See id. Nearly half of all undocumented immigrants are parents
of minor children. See id. By comparison, only 38% of authorized immigrant adults and
29% of U.S.-born adults are parents of minor children. See id. at 5. Of the current
undocumented immigrant population in the United States, an estimated 1.2 million are
under the age of eighteen and 1.29 million are between the ages of eighteen and twentyfour. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, at 5 (Feb. 2011), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.
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See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigr.& Customs
Enforcement, to Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel (June
17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretion-memo.pdf (providing factors to consider in the enforcement of immigration law);
see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226 (“[T]here is no assurance that a child subject to deportation
will ever be deported . . . . In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from
deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child
will in fact be deported . . . .”).
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expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.190 I
propose that, normatively, a territorial model is the most just
system for distributing membership rights in the citizenship
sphere. Individuals who live and work alongside each other
should receive rights on the same terms to avoid the possibility
that one group will become subject to the tyranny of another.
Current proposals to deny citizenship to the children of
undocumented immigrants191 would distribute membership
rights on different terms to individuals who are effectively
identical in all substantive respects.
These proposals are not proposals to replace jus soli
with jus sanguinis, although they are often labeled as such. A
true jus sanguinis law of citizenship would offer citizenship
only to the children of citizens, and it would deny citizenship to
the children of aliens. Proposals to deny citizenship to the
children of undocumented immigrants, however, also grant
citizenship to the children of aliens who are legally in the
United States. Children of legal resident aliens would thus be
treated the same as children of citizens based on a territorial
conception of citizenship: they would be subject to jus soli. The
children of undocumented immigrants, however, would be
excluded from this territorial notion of citizenship based on
their parents’ immigration status. In essence, such proposals
do not deny birthright citizenship based on a parent’s
citizenship but rather on a parent’s violation of immigration
law. Such punishment for a parent’s crime has no place in
American law and would result in a class of U.S. residents who
live, study, and work among citizens but are, nonetheless,
subcitizens. The creation of this class would represent a
significant departure from the egalitarian system of
opportunity that is the hallmark of the U.S. legal system.
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See, e.g., Nicole Newman, Birthright Citizenship: The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Continuing Protection Against an American Caste System, 28 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 437, 448, 466-72 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Citizenship Clause,
Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1363, 1365-68 (2009).
191
See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); A Bill to Amend
the Immigration and Nationality Act to Limit Citizenship at Birth, Merely by Virtue of
Birth in the United States, to Persons with Citizen or Legal Resident Mothers, H.R.
126, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009); Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong.
§ 3(a) (2007).
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CONCLUSION
Although the Constitution makes little, if any,
distinction between citizens and noncitizens, citizenship carries
a great deal of meaning in the United States. For citizens, it
confirms a sense of belonging, protection, and community. For
noncitizens, it is the finish line that marks acceptance.
Children of undocumented immigrants who are born in the
United States are Americans by all substantive measures.
They are raised and schooled here, and they are subject to our
laws. They are at home in the United States.192 Proposals to
deny citizenship to these children threaten to put their
citizenship at odds with their identity as Americans. Perhaps
more importantly, denying citizenship to children of
undocumented immigrants threatens to put our sense of what
it means to be a just, egalitarian community at odds with what
it means to be an American citizen.
As legislators consider citizenship, and as they
reconsider the Fourteenth Amendment’s strong territorial
flavor based on claims that too much has changed since the
Amendment’s adoption, it is important to explore the historical
rationales for grants of citizenship. Territoriality is worth
abandoning only if its underlying rationales no longer apply.
The rationales of territoriality still apply today in the context of
citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants.

192

According to a Pew Research Center study, 60% of foreign-born adults in
the U.S. consider the U.S. their “home,” while 26% of U.S.-born adults who have lived
in more than one place say they consider their state of birth to be home. See AMERICAN
MOBILITY, supra note 187.

